A waqf is the permanent dedication of property for a purpose recognised by Muslim law as religious, pious or charitable. Its defining feature, and the one from which everything else follows, is that ownership is extinguished in the dedicator and is regarded as vesting in God, with only the usufruct applied to the object. That is what distinguishes a waqf from every other transaction in this paper: a gift transfers ownership from one person to another, whereas a waqf takes the property out of private ownership altogether.
Legal Framework
| Source | Provision | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Classical definition | Abu Hanifa | The detention of a specific thing in the ownership of the waqif or appropriator, and the devoting of its profits or usufruct to charity, the poor or other good objects |
| Classical definition | Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad | The extinction of the appropriator's ownership in the thing dedicated, and the detention of the thing in the implied ownership of God, in such a manner that its profits may revert to or be applied for the benefit of mankind. This is the view followed in India |
| Statutory definition | S.3(r) of the Waqf Act 1995 | The permanent dedication by any person of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable |
| Validating statutes | Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913, and Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1930 | Declared the right of Muslims to make family settlements by way of waqf, the 1913 Act prospectively and the 1930 Act retrospectively |
| Current statute | Waqf Act 1995, renamed by the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 as the Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development Act 1995 | Registration, administration, Boards and Tribunals |
Why the difference between the two classical definitions matters: Abu Hanifa's definition leaves ownership in the waqif, which would make the dedication revocable and would allow the property to pass to his heirs. The view of Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad extinguishes his ownership, vesting the property in God. India follows the latter, and three consequences follow directly: the waqf is irrevocable, the property is inalienable, and it is not heritable. Almost every rule in the topic is a working out of that single choice.
Essentials of a Valid Waqf
| Essential | Content |
|---|---|
| Permanent dedication | The dedication must be complete at once, and not contingent or postponed |
| Perpetuity | The dedication must be perpetual. A waqf for a limited period is void |
| Irrevocability | Once complete, the waqf cannot be revoked |
| Competent waqif | Of sound mind, having attained majority, and the owner of the property |
| Recognised purpose | A purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable |
| Substantial charitable object | The charitable gift must be substantial, and not illusory or so remote as to be nominal: Abul Fata |
| Subject matter | Any property, movable or immovable, capable of being dedicated, and in existence at the time |
| Divesting | The waqif must divest himself of ownership; the property vests in God |
| No particular form | No formal words are required and the word "waqf" need not be used: Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim |
Facts: A suit under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure concerning the Maulanagar khankah estate in Monghyr, endowed by a sanad of Nawab Alivardi Khan in 1748 for the expenses of drum beaters, for casual visitors to the khankah, and as madad mash for the saint and his descendants, generation after generation, confirmed by the East India Company in 1787 and 1791. The sajjadanashin in possession claimed the property was his private property and that the charitable references were a mere pious wish.
Held: The properties were waqf, or at any rate property burdened with a public religious or charitable obligation within S.92. A valid waqf requires a substantial dedication of the usufruct to purposes recognised in Muhammadan law; no particular form is necessary; a waqf may be inferred from royal grants in favour of individual persons so long as the purpose was perpetual; the dedicator need not use the word "waqf" nor formally transfer to God; and where there is a substantial dedication to a valid object the waqf is not vitiated because some non valid objects are also mentioned. Perpetuity is necessary but need not be expressly stated, and where the named purpose is liable to failure the waqf remains valid and the property goes to the poor.
Citation caution: commonly cited as "M Kazim v A Asghar Ali, AIR 1932 PC 34" and described as a Privy Council decision. It is a Patna High Court decision at AIR 1932 Pat 33, decided 6 July 1931.
Why perpetuity is essential and why it need not be stated. Perpetuity is essential because the property has been taken out of private ownership: if the dedication were for a term, ownership would have to revert to someone at the end of it, and there is no one for it to revert to. But the requirement is satisfied in substance, so no formula is needed, and a purpose which may itself fail does not defeat the waqf, the property then passing to the poor as the residual object. This is the same substance over form approach that governs hiba, where writing and registration are unnecessary because the transaction is constituted by acts.
Waqf by User
Facts: Predecessors of the respondents obtained the then owner's permission to build a mosque on his raised platform, executing an agreement reciting that they would claim no right except to worship and light lamps, that the construction was purely for worship, and that there would be a separate doorway and windows. The mosque was built, adjuncts were added as gifts, and adjacent vacant land was used as a burial ground. When the appellants built shops on part of the graveyard, the respondents sued under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming that the burial ground, the Dargah and the mosque were all public waqf.
Held: All three were public waqf. Four conditions for a valid dedication of a public nature: (1) the founder must declare his intention to dedicate, no particular form being necessary and the declaration being capable of being presumed from conduct; (2) he must divest himself completely of ownership, which may be inferred from delivery of possession; (3) the property must be separated from the rest of his property with a way of access provided; and (4) there must be delivery, which for a mosque means people praying there in jamaat, and where there is no express dedication, prayers must have been offered with azan and ikamat.
Where prayers have once been offered it is unnecessary to prove an express dedication, and prayer by even one person with azan and ikamat suffices, since a mosque belongs to the Deity and one person can act as proxy for the Creator and the public. Dedication may also be inferred from long user as waqf property. For a graveyard, if the public are permitted to be buried and the practice is proved by instances adequate in character, number and extent, dedication is presumed complete. Once a kabarstan is a public graveyard, non user does not change its character. A mosque cannot be consecrated for only a particular class or locality, any such reservation being void, and the site of a masjid never reverts to the original owner or his heirs.
Before 2025 a waqf could be constituted by declaration, by user, or by endowment on the ending of the line of succession (waqf alal aulad). The Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 has omitted the provisions relating to waqf by user as a mode of creating a waqf going forward, and new S.3A requires the waqif to be the lawful owner of the property and competent to transfer or dedicate it.
So Salie Labbai governs waqfs already created but not future dedications. Existing waqf by user properties have been protected by interim direction rather than by the statute: on 17 April 2025 the Supreme Court directed that no waqf property, "whether registered, unregistered, or waqf by user", be denotified or interfered with, and the Union informed the Court on 21 April 2025 that it was holding the waqf by user clause in abeyance pending decision. The challenge remains pending; see The Waqf Act 1995 and the 2025 Amendment.
Why waqf by user existed at all, and what its removal means: Very many Indian waqfs, particularly mosques, graveyards and dargahs of long standing, were created informally, orally, and centuries ago, with no surviving deed. The doctrine of waqf by user allowed the law to recognise as waqf what had in fact been treated as waqf for generations. Removing it prospectively means that a future dedication must be documented and made by a proven owner, which improves certainty of title but withdraws the mechanism by which informal endowments were recognised. That is the substance of the criticism of the amendment on this point, and it should be stated as a trade off rather than as a simple loss.
Kinds of Waqf
| Kind | Content |
|---|---|
| Public waqf | For the benefit of the public at large or a section of it, for example a mosque, a public graveyard, a school, a hospital, a bridge or a well |
| Private waqf, or waqf alal aulad | Primarily for the benefit of the waqif's own family and descendants, the ultimate benefit going to charity on the extinction of the line |
| Quasi public waqf | Partly for the public and partly for the waqif's family |
| Waqf by declaration | Created by an express declaration of dedication |
| Waqf by user | Established by long user as waqf property. Removed prospectively by the 2025 amendment |
| Waqf alal aulad on ending of the line | Endowment taking effect on the ending of the succession |
| Waqf during marz ul maut | Made during death illness; treated as a will and confined to the bequeathable third |
Waqf alal aulad and the Abul Fata controversy
Facts: Two brothers executed a deed in 1868 purporting to be a waqfnamah of all their immovable property, without particularising items. They appointed themselves mutawallis, and in 1874 declared that they had revoked the waqf because of their necessities, thereafter dealing with the property as their own; one, heavily in debt, mortgaged and alienated numerous parcels. The provision for charity was to take effect only on the extinction of the settlors' line, and so was remote and in practical terms illusory. In 1888 his sons sued as beneficiaries to have the whole declared waqf and to recover the alienated parcels.
Held: The deed did not create a valid waqf. A settlement whose substance and dominating purpose is provision for the settlor's family and descendants, with the charitable object dependent on the failure of the line, is a family settlement dressed as a waqf and is void. The charitable gift must be substantial and not illusory or so remote as to be nominal.
Note the spelling: the first name is Abul, not Abdul. The composition of the Board and the delivering member could not be verified and are not stated.
The legislative reversal, which must be stated precisely:
| Statute | Effect |
|---|---|
| Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913 (Act VI of 1913) | Declared the right of Muslims to make settlements of property by way of waqf in favour of their families, children and descendants, the ultimate benefit being reserved for charity. Prospective only |
| Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1930 (Act XXXII of 1930) | Gave the 1913 Act retrospective effect |
Two refinements worth carrying. First, the 1913 Act was prospective and it took the 1930 Act to make it retrospective; many answers conflate the two. Second, Abul Fata was superseded by statute in British India, not judicially overruled, and the 1913 Act did not extend to the former State of Hyderabad, so the validity of a Hyderabad waqf continued to be governed by Islamic law rather than by the Privy Council decision. That last point is worth a line in an Osmania paper.
The 2025 amendment addresses the same concern from the opposite direction. It now requires that a waqf alal aulad must not result in denial of inheritance rights to the donor's heirs, including women heirs. The Privy Council's objection in 1894 was that the family waqf could be used to defeat creditors and the Quranic shares; the 2025 provision guards the Quranic shares expressly, and in particular those of women.
Waqf Distinguished from Other Transactions
| Basis | Waqf | Sadaqah | Hiba | Trust (Indian Trusts Act) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Extinguished in the dedicator, vesting in God | Transferred to the donee | Transferred to the donee | Vests in the trustee |
| What is applied to the object | The usufruct only | The property itself | The property itself | Income or corpus as the deed provides |
| Perpetuity | Essential | Not required | Not required | Not required |
| Revocable | No | No | Before delivery freely; after by decree | Depends on the instrument |
| Object | Religious, pious or charitable | Religious merit | Bounty or affection | Any lawful purpose |
| Administration | By a mutawalli, who is a manager and not an owner | None; the donee owns it | None | By a trustee, in whom the property vests |
| Alienable | No | Yes | Yes | As the deed permits |
Why the mutawalli is not a trustee, and why that matters: A trustee owns the trust property in law, subject to the beneficial interest. A mutawalli owns nothing: the property is God's, and the mutawalli is a manager or superintendent with no beneficial interest and no power of alienation without the sanction of the court or the Board. The distinction is not merely conceptual; it decides whether the manager can deal with the property, and it is the reason the Waqf Act imposes a statutory regime of control. See Mutawalli: Powers, Duties and Removal.
The Constitutional Position of Waqf Property
Two cases mark the boundary, and they should be cited together.
Held, on the aspect relevant here, by a majority of three to two: irrespective of the status of a mosque under Muslim law in Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the Mahomedan law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to that of any other place of worship of any religion, and it does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition under the sovereign power of the State. Title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession; Art.25 contains no reference to property; and Art.26 does not curtail the power of acquisition. The Court also held S.4(3) of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 unconstitutional for abating pending suits without providing an alternative mechanism, and characterised the Government as a statutory receiver.
On the "not an essential part of the practice of Islam" observation: it appears at paragraph 85 in the section on immunity from acquisition, and the Court's formal conclusion is the narrower one that a mosque enjoys no greater immunity from acquisition. A three Judge Bench in M Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das (2018) declined by two to one to refer the observation to a larger Bench, confining it to the acquisition context, S Abdul Nazeer J dissenting. State it in that form and not as a free standing holding.
Held, by four to one with Sinha CJ dissenting: on the faith and tenets of the Dawoodi Bohras, the exercise of the power of excommunication by the religious head on religious grounds forms part of the management of the community's affairs in matters of religion, so a statute invalidating even such excommunication infringes Art.26(b). Arts.25 and 26 protect not merely doctrines and beliefs but acts done in pursuance of religion, and what is essential is judged in the light of the religion's doctrine and of what the community itself regards as part of it. The Art.26(b) right is not subject to the preservation of civil rights.
Currency: the correctness of this decision was doubted and referred to a larger Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 673, later tagged with the Sabarimala review questions before a nine Judge Bench. Whether the reference has been decided could not be established.
The boundary the two cases mark: internal religious governance, such as who belongs to the denomination and who may administer its affairs, is strongly protected by Art.26(b). Property, including a mosque, is not immune from the sovereign power of acquisition. Stating the contrast in those terms is an effective way to open or close an essay on the constitutional position of waqf.
Illustrations
-
No formal words needed. A landowner allows a mosque to be built on part of his land, provides a separate entrance, and prayers are offered there with azan and ikamat. A waqf is constituted even though no deed exists and the word "waqf" was never used: Salie Labbai, Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim.
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Illusory charity. A settlor dedicates all his property, appointing himself mutawalli, the income to go to his descendants generation after generation and to charity only when his line dies out. The charitable object is illusory and the waqf is void: Abul Fata. Note that the 1913 Act, made retrospective by the 1930 Act, has since validated family waqfs where the ultimate benefit is reserved for charity.
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Waqf for a limited period. A dedication of income to a mosque for twenty years, the property then reverting to the dedicator's heirs. Void for want of perpetuity.
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Named purpose fails. A waqf is created for the upkeep of a particular school which later closes. The waqf does not fail; the property goes to the poor: Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim.
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Non valid object alongside a valid one. A grant provides for a mosque, for travellers, and for the settlor's personal expenses. The presence of the non valid object does not vitiate the waqf where there is a substantial dedication to a valid object.
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Graveyard, non user. Land long used as a public burial ground falls into disuse for thirty years. It remains public waqf; non user does not change its character: Salie Labbai.
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Acquisition. The State acquires land on which a mosque stands, for a public purpose, paying compensation. The acquisition is not prohibited: a mosque enjoys no greater immunity than any other place of worship: Ismail Faruqui.
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A future dedication after the 2025 amendment. A person who is not the lawful owner purports to dedicate land as waqf in 2026. S.3A now requires the waqif to be the lawful owner competent to transfer or dedicate, so the dedication fails. Note separately that the five year practising Islam requirement in S.3(r) is presently stayed until the States frame guidelines: In Re: The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.
Recall Check
- State the definition of waqf followed in India, and name the three consequences that follow from the extinction of the waqif's ownership.
- List the essentials of a valid waqf, and explain why perpetuity is essential yet need not be expressly stated.
- Set out the four conditions in Salie Labbai for a valid public dedication, and state what suffices for a mosque and for a graveyard.
Key Cases
Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry 1894
Issue: Whether a settlement primarily for the settlor's family, with charity taking effect only on the extinction of the line, creates a valid waqf.
Rule: No. A settlement whose substance and dominating purpose is family provision, the charitable object being illusory or remote, is a family settlement dressed as a waqf and is void; the charitable gift must be substantial.
Held: The deed created no valid waqf. Superseded by the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913, made retrospective by the 1930 Act.
Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim v Syed Abi Saghir (1931) Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim v Syed Abi Saghir 1932
Issue: Whether royal grants for a khankah, without a formal deed and including non charitable objects, created a valid waqf.
Rule: A substantial dedication of the usufruct to recognised purposes suffices; no particular form is necessary; the word "waqf" need not be used; non valid objects do not vitiate the waqf; perpetuity is necessary but need not be expressly stated, and where the named purpose fails the property goes to the poor.
Held: The properties were waqf. A Patna High Court decision at AIR 1932 Pat 33, not a Privy Council decision.
Syed Mohd Salie Labbai v Mohd Hanifa (1976) Syed Md Salie Labbai v Mohd Hanifa 1976
Issue: Whether a mosque, Dargah and burial ground were public waqf in the absence of an express deed.
Rule: Four conditions for a valid public dedication: declaration presumable from conduct, complete divesting inferable from delivery, separation with a way of access, and delivery, which for a mosque means prayer in jamaat with azan and ikamat where there is no express dedication. Dedication may be inferred from long user; non user does not divest a public graveyard.
Held: All three items were public waqf.
Dr M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994) Md Ismail Faruqui v Union of India 1994
Issue: Whether a mosque enjoys immunity from acquisition, and the validity of the Ayodhya acquisition statute.
Rule: A mosque enjoys no greater immunity from acquisition than any other place of worship; Art.25 contains no reference to property and Art.26 does not curtail acquisition. S.4(3), abating pending suits without an alternative mechanism, is unconstitutional and severable.
Held: The Act upheld save for S.4(3); the Government holds the area as statutory receiver.
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v State of Bombay (1962) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin v State of Bombay 1962
Issue: Whether a statute invalidating excommunication infringes Art.26(b).
Rule: The power of excommunication exercised on religious grounds is part of the management of the denomination's affairs in matters of religion, and Art.26(b) is not subject to the preservation of civil rights.
Held: The Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act 1949 void, by four to one, Sinha CJ dissenting. Subject to a pending larger Bench reconsideration.
In Re: The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 In Re Waqf Amendment Act 2025
Issue: Whether the operation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 should be stayed pending final adjudication.
Rule: Interim order. The Act as a whole was not stayed, the presumption being in favour of constitutionality; S.3(r) was stayed as to the five year practising Islam requirement until the States frame guidelines, and parts of S.3C were stayed on separation of powers grounds.
Held: Partial interim stay with protective directions. The challenge remains pending; verify the current position.
Distinctions
| Basis | Abu Hanifa's definition | Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad's definition |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Remains in the waqif | Extinguished, vesting in God |
| Revocable | Would be | No |
| Heritable | Would be | No |
| Followed in India | No | Yes |
| Basis | Public waqf | Waqf alal aulad |
|---|---|---|
| Primary beneficiary | The public or a section of it | The waqif's family and descendants |
| Ultimate benefit | The public purpose | Charity, on extinction of the line |
| Status before 1913 | Valid | Held void where charity was illusory: Abul Fata |
| Status after 1913 and 1930 | Valid | Valid, the 1913 Act being made retrospective by the 1930 Act |
| Position under the 2025 amendment | Unchanged in principle | Must not deny inheritance rights to the donor's heirs, including women heirs |
| Basis | Waqf | Sadaqah |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Extinguished, vesting in God | Transferred to the donee |
| Applied to the object | The usufruct only | The property itself |
| Perpetuity | Essential | Not required |
| Administration | By a mutawalli | None |
| Basis | Mutawalli | Trustee |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership of the property | None; the property is God's | Vests in him, subject to the beneficial interest |
| Character | Manager or superintendent | Owner in law |
| Power of alienation | None without sanction | As the instrument permits |
| Beneficial interest | None | None, but legal title yes |
Flashcards
Define waqf.
The permanent dedication of property for a purpose recognised by Muslim law as religious, pious or charitable, ownership being extinguished in the dedicator and vesting in God, with only the usufruct applied to the object.
Which classical definition does India follow, and why does it matter?
That of Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad, under which the waqif's ownership is extinguished and the property vests in God. It follows that the waqf is irrevocable, the property inalienable, and it is not heritable.
What is the statutory definition of waqf?
S.3(r) of the Waqf Act 1995: the permanent dedication by any person of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable.
Name the essentials of a valid waqf.
Permanent dedication, perpetuity, irrevocability, a competent waqif who is the owner, a purpose recognised as pious religious or charitable, a substantial and not illusory charitable object, subject matter in existence, and divesting by the waqif.
Must the word "waqf" be used?
No. No particular form is necessary and the dedicator need not use the word or formally transfer to God: Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim.
Is perpetuity required to be expressly stated?
No. It is a necessary condition but need not be expressly stated, and where the named purpose fails the waqf remains valid and the property goes to the poor.
What happens if a waqf includes both valid and non valid objects?
Where there is a substantial dedication to a valid object, the waqf is not vitiated by the mention of non valid objects.
State the four conditions in *Salie Labbai*.
Declaration of intention, capable of being presumed from conduct; complete divesting of ownership, inferable from delivery of possession; separation of the property with a way of access; and delivery, which for a mosque means prayer in jamaat, with azan and ikamat where there is no express dedication.
What suffices to constitute a public mosque where there is no express dedication?
Prayer offered with azan and ikamat, by even one person, since a mosque belongs to the Deity and one person may act as proxy for the Creator and the public.
Does disuse destroy the character of a public graveyard?
No. Once a kabarstan is a public graveyard, non user does not change its character, and the site of a masjid never reverts to the original owner.
What was held in *Abul Fata*?
That a settlement whose substance and dominating purpose is provision for the settlor's family, the charitable object being illusory or dependent on the extinction of the line, is void as a waqf.
How was *Abul Fata* reversed?
By the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913, which was prospective, and the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1930, which made the 1913 Act retrospective. It was superseded by statute, not judicially overruled.
What is the position of waqf by user after the 2025 amendment?
It has been removed as a mode of creating a waqf going forward, S.3A now requiring the waqif to be the lawful owner competent to transfer or dedicate. Existing waqf by user properties have been protected by interim direction, and the challenge to the amendment remains pending.
Does a mosque enjoy immunity from State acquisition?
No. It enjoys no greater immunity than any other place of worship: Ismail Faruqui (1994). Art.25 contains no reference to property and Art.26 does not curtail the power of acquisition.
How does a mutawalli differ from a trustee?
A trustee owns the trust property in law. A mutawalli owns nothing, the property being God's, and is a manager or superintendent with no power of alienation without sanction.
Exam Scenario
Problem: In 1965 Haji Rahim, then the owner of land in Hyderabad, permitted the local Muslim community to build a mosque on part of it, providing a separate gateway. Prayers have been offered there with azan since 1966. Adjacent vacant land was used for burials by the community from 1970 until about 1995, after which burials ceased. In 1972 Haji Rahim executed a deed declaring the whole of his remaining property to be waqf, the income to be applied for the maintenance of his descendants generation after generation and, on the extinction of his line, for a madrasa; he appointed himself mutawalli and continued to deal with the property as his own, mortgaging part of it in 1980. In 2026 Haji Rahim's grandson, who is not a practising Muslim, purports to dedicate a further plot as waqf. The State proposes to acquire the mosque land for a road. Advise on the character of each property and on the acquisition.
Step 1: The mosque and the graveyard as waqf by user
No deed exists, but that is not fatal: no particular form is necessary and the word "waqf" need not be used, Syed Shah Muhammad Kazim. Apply the four conditions in Salie Labbai to the mosque.
- Declaration, presumed from Haji Rahim's conduct in permitting the construction.
- Divesting, inferred from delivery of possession to the community.
- Separation of the property with a way of access, the facts expressly mentioning a separate gateway, which mirrors Salie Labbai closely.
- Delivery, established because prayers have been offered with azan since 1966; where prayers have once been offered it is unnecessary to prove an express dedication.
The mosque is therefore public waqf.
For the graveyard the test is instances of public burial adequate in character, number and extent, which twenty five years of community burials plainly satisfies. The cessation of burials in 1995 is immaterial: once a kabarstan is a public graveyard, non user does not change its character, just as the site of a masjid never reverts.
Step 2: Prospectivity of the 2025 removal of waqf by user
The 2025 amendment removed waqf by user going forward only. These dedications were completed in the 1960s and 1970s, and the amendment does not undo waqfs already created.
Existing waqf by user properties have in any event been protected by interim direction in the pending challenge, so the mosque and the graveyard remain waqf.
Step 3: The 1972 deed: the Abul Fata problem and its statutory solution
The deed is a waqf alal aulad: income to the descendants generation after generation, charity taking effect only on the extinction of the line. On Abul Fata alone it would be void, the charitable object being remote and illusory.
The surrounding facts strengthen that reading. Haji Rahim appointed himself mutawalli, continued to deal with the property as his own, and mortgaged part of it in 1980, all of which mirror Abul Fata almost exactly.
But Abul Fata has been superseded by statute. The Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913 declared the right of Muslims to make settlements in favour of their families with the ultimate benefit reserved for charity, and the 1930 Act made the 1913 Act retrospective. The ultimate benefit here goes to a madrasa, a recognised object, so the waqf is valid.
The Hyderabad point, which the facts invite. The 1913 Act did not extend to the former State of Hyderabad, so the validity of a Hyderabad waqf continued to be governed by Islamic law rather than by Abul Fata.
The property is in Hyderabad, but the deed is of 1972, well after Hyderabad's accession and integration, so the Indian statutory position applies. Identify the point and dispose of it rather than ignoring it.
Step 4: Consequences of a valid waqf for the mortgage and the mutawalli
Ownership was extinguished in Haji Rahim and vested in God, the property became inalienable, and he held only as mutawalli, a manager with no power of alienation without the sanction of the court or the Board.
The 1980 mortgage was therefore made without authority and is liable to be set aside, and his dealing with the property as his own was a breach of his duties as mutawalli, which would have justified his removal.
The 2025 amendment adds that a waqf alal aulad must not result in denial of inheritance rights to the donor's heirs, including women heirs, which an excluded heir may now raise against a deed of this kind.
Step 5: The grandson's 2026 dedication
Two provisions of the amended Act bear on it. New S.3A requires the waqif to be the lawful owner of the property and competent to transfer or dedicate it, so his title must be established.
The amended S.3(r) requires the waqif to have been practising Islam for at least five years, which on the facts he has not. But that requirement is presently stayed by the interim order of 15 September 2025 in In Re: The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.
The stay operates until the States frame guidelines for determining who is a practising Muslim, the Court having held the requirement unsustainable as capable of arbitrary application without such a mechanism.
So the objection on that ground is not presently available, though it may revive once guidelines are framed.
Step 6: The acquisition, and the character of each property drawn together
Apply Ismail Faruqui. Irrespective of the status of a mosque in Islamic countries, under the law applicable in secular India a mosque enjoys no greater immunity from acquisition than any other place of worship. Art.25 contains no reference to property and Art.26 does not curtail the power of acquisition.
The acquisition is therefore not prohibited, subject to compliance with the acquisition statute and payment of compensation. Contrast Sardar Syedna to mark the boundary: internal religious governance is strongly protected under Art.26(b), but property is not immune.
| Property | Character | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| The mosque, permitted 1965, prayers since 1966 | Public waqf by user | The four conditions in Salie Labbai, including the separate gateway and prayer with azan |
| The burial ground, used 1970 to about 1995 | Public waqf; the disuse is immaterial | Burials adequate in character, number and extent; non user does not change the character |
| The property in the 1972 deed | Valid waqf alal aulad | Abul Fata superseded by the 1913 Act, made retrospective by the 1930 Act; ultimate benefit to a madrasa |
| The part mortgaged in 1980 | Waqf property, the mortgage unauthorised | Ownership extinguished and vested in God; a mutawalli cannot alienate without sanction |
| The plot dedicated in 2026 | Turns on ownership under S.3A | The S.3(r) five year practising Islam requirement is presently stayed |
| The mosque land under acquisition | Acquirable | Ismail Faruqui: no greater immunity than any other place of worship |
The 1913 and 1930 Acts must be distinguished. The 1913 Act was prospective; it took the 1930 Act to make it retrospective. A candidate who says only that the 1913 Act validated family waqfs misses that.
The presumption from user requires the user to be proved. The basic fact of user cannot itself be presumed, following the Madras High Court in Lakshmi Saroja, though it is satisfied here.
State the Ismail Faruqui observation in its proper form. The remark that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam was made in the acquisition context at paragraph 85, and was later confined to that context in M Siddiq (2018) by two to one, Nazeer J dissenting.
The challenge to the 2025 amendment remains pending, so the position should be verified before it is relied on.
Conclusion. The mosque and the graveyard are public waqf by user; the 1972 deed creates a valid waqf alal aulad by force of the 1913 and 1930 Acts, so the 1980 mortgage was unauthorised; the grandson's 2026 dedication turns on his ownership under S.3A; and the acquisition of the mosque land is lawful.
See Also
- The Waqf Act 1995 and the 2025 Amendment : the statutory regime, the 2025 changes and the pending challenge.
- Mutawalli: Powers, Duties and Removal : who administers a waqf and on what terms.
- Kinds of Gift, Musha and Revocation : sadaqah and hiba, distinguished from waqf.
- Wills (Wasiyat) under Muslim Law : a waqf made during marz ul maut, confined to the bequeathable third.
- Schools of Muslim Law: Sunni and Shia : the denominations whose religious governance Art.26 protects.